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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
) 
) CASE NO. 14488 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, MAX W. YOUNG, AUDREY L. YOUNG, 
and ROGER CLARK YOUNG [YOUNG] are all minority shareholders 
in the four (4) defendant companies and commenced this 
action against WYCOFF COMPANY, INC. [COMPANY]; WYCOFF 
WAREHOUSE, INC. [WAREHOUSE]; WYCOFF CORPORATION [CORPOR-
ATION]; MOUNTAIN SERVICE, INC. [MOUNTAIN SERVICE]; and ZIONS 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK [ZIONS], as Executor of the estate of 
M. S. Wycoff, deceased, and as Trustee under the Last Will 
and Testament of Milton Stanley "Slim" Wycoff, seeking 
relief on two separate claims. The first claim sought 
MAX W. YOUNG, et. al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
WYCOFF COMPANY, INC., et. al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
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(1) an order directing defendant Zions to transfer certain 
securities to the other defendants as required by an agreement 
of April 26, 1965 among Max W. Young, M. S. Wycoff and 
others, (2) an accounting by defendant Zions with respect to 
its dividend, distribution and debt relationships with the 
other defendants, (3) the appointment of a receiver for 
defendants Company, Warehouse, Corporation, and Mountain 
Service, and (4) judgment that defendants Company, Warehouse, 
Corporation and Mountain Service be dissolved, wound up and 
their assets distributed. The second claim sought judgment 
against the defendants because of their wrongful discharge 
and removal of plaintiff Max Young from the management and 
board of directors of the defendant Wycoff corporations, and 
damages in the amount of $120,000 by way of lost compensation. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, 
District Judge, who entered Judgment on January 26, 1976, in 
favor of defendants and against plaintiffs, no cause of 
action, on all claims: and awarded defendants their costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
:. Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of 
the District Court, entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs 
on both claims, and such other relief as this court deems 
proper. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The four defendant companies other than Zions collec-
tively hereinafter referred to as the "Wycoff Companies", 
are all.closely held Utah corporations engaged in the trucking, 
transportation and warehousing business. Company operates a 
trucking business in Utah and portions of Idaho and Colorado 
providing handling of specialty items such as film and mail* 
Mountain Service owns trucks and equipment which it leases 
principally to Company, Warehouse owns an office building 
and three warehouses. Corporation owns four warehouses and 
also owns, and leases to Company, a shop building, dock, 
garage and terminal area. The Wycoff Companies have inter-
related business operations and have common members on their 
respective boards of directors. 
Appellants own approximately twenty-five percent of the 
outstanding voting stock in defendants Company, Warehouse, 
and Corporation. Mountain Service is wholly owned and 
controlled (99.99%) by Company. Legal title to and the 
right to vote the controlling majority stock of Company, 
Warehouse, and Corporation is held, and at all times material 
hereto, was held, by defendant Zions as executor of the 
estate of M. S. Wycoff and trustee under the last will and 
testament of Milton Stanley ("Slim") Wycoff. 
-3-
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Appellant Max Young was first employed by Company in 
January of 1950 as a clerk, and in time was promoted to the 
office of business manager. He was also business manager of 
Corporation from the time of its inception and generally 
developed and managed both Mountain Service and Warehouse as 
general manager. During his tenure with the Wycoff Companies, 
Mr. Young sat on their boards of directors as executive 
vice-president of all four boards. The other members of the 
boards consisted of C. Leland Clayton, M. S. Wycoff and Earl 
Lewis who were all stockholders directly involved in the 
daily operations of the Wycoff Companies. 
Appellants acquired their 25 percent interest in the 
Wycoff companies through a combination of gifts from M. S. 
Wycoff and purchases from the corporation. The gifts were . 
given primarily to appellant Young as compensation for his 
service to the corporations and as an inducement to insure 
Young's continued service in the business. Max Young worked 
hard and faithfully for the corporations during his employment 
to enhance the value of his interest and that of the other 
shareholders. 
M. S. Wycoff, the princiapl founder of the Wycoff 
Companies died testate on March 3, 1966, and all of his 
controlling stock in the Wycoff Companies was distributed to 
-4-
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Zions under two trusts established by M. S. Wycoff fs will. 
Upon the death of M. S. Wycoff, Max Young became the chief 
executive officer of each of the companies, a position he 
maintained with the acquiescence of Zions until February 1, 
1968. 
During Max Young's association with the Wycoff Com-
panies they had a history of continued growth and expansion 
into new commodities and geographic localities ("authorities"). 
To accomplish this expansion the companies had followed a 
policy of tight financial management: operating on a low 
profit margin, and reinvesting profits into the firms (Tr. 
34-35, 39-40) [Exhibits P-22, P-23, D-10]. When Max Young 
assumed operational control of the Companies after M. S. 
Wycoff*s death, it was his objective to continue these 
historical policies and expand the Companies* territory to 
include the West Coast. (Tr. 34-35) Acquisition of new 
routes required additional equipment and added facilities 
which, of course, cost money. 
At the time of his death, M. S. Wycoff s principal 
asset consisted of stock and debentures in the Wycoff Compan-
ies [Exhibits D-42, D-43]. The total asset value of his 
estate was approximately $501,841.50 (Tr. 246) and was 
subject to approximately $78,177.75 federal and $65,000 
-5-
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state estate taxes (Tr. 299-300), as well as widow's allowances* 
Zions wanted immediate cash to satisfy these estates liabili-
ties and sought to utilize the Wycoff Companies as vehicles 
for generating funds [e.g. Exhibits D-50, D-51]. As Zion's 
principal trust executive, Claron Spencer testified that 
Zions viewed the interests of the estate and the companies 
as "parallel." (Tr. 256-57) 
From March, 1966, until September, 1967, Zions did not 
take an active interest in the daily operations of the 
Wycoff companies although it was interested in obtaining 
funds from them. Max Young operated the companies during 
this period and they were more profitable than ever before 
but, as Mr. Young informed Claron Spencer, there were seldom 
any funds available for the estate in light of the companies 
needs for growth [Exhibit D-10]. Even prior to the death of 
M. S. Wycoff, the companies had never maintained a regular 
dividend policy. Nevertheless, the directors of the Wycoff 
Companies made every effort to assist the estate in satisfying 
its liabilities. As a result of their conflicting objectives, 
however, relationships between Max Young and Zions became 
strained. 
On September 1, 1967, a meeting was held at the request 
of Claron Spencer for the purpose of expanding the boards of 
-6-
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directors of each corporation from four to nine [Exhibits D-
11, D-12]. The estate was in need of funds, and rather than 
sell some of the estate assets to satisfy these obligations, 
Zions sought to obtain managerial control of the Wycoff 
companies so that it could channel funds from the companies 
into the estate. Appellant Max Young attended this meeting 
and protested the proposed change for the reason that the 
corporations had always operated with internal boards of 
directors who were familiar with the needs of the companies 
[Exhibit D-12]. Zions voted its controlling stock at the 
meeting including certain shares of Mountain Service, the 
ownership of which was at that time a matter of dispute, and 
the boards of directors of each company were increased from 
four to nine. Thereafter, Zions nominated and elected five 
additional members to each board. Four of these new directors 
were employees of Zions and the fifth was the attorney 
representing the estate. None of the new directors had any 
experience in the transportation industry (Tr. 261). As 
Claron Spencer testified, the purpose of this board reorgani-
zation was to facilitate a preconceived plan for the redemp-
tion of stock and debentures and to slow down the growth of 
the companies which would materially advance the interests 
of the estate (Tr. 260-263). 
-7-
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During November, 1967, the new boards passed resolu-
tions limiting managements1 ability to bid on new contracts 
or routes, setting a $10,000 ceiling on expenditures and 
creating an Executive Committee to oversee all company 
spending. [See e.g. Exhibits P-41 and P-30 to -32] By the 
terms of these resolutions, a limitation on management was 
necessitated by "certain financial commitments . • . placed 
on the corporation in the near future due to the death of 
the founder." Again, as Claron Spencer testified, the 
purpose of these and subsequent acts discussed below "was to 
slow down the growth of the companies so that there would be 
greater use of the income and assets available to the trustee 
or executor" (Tr. 262). 
During December, 1967, Spencer and other Zion board 
members discussed plans with William Shea for the creation 
of a new position of "comptroller." Young and the other 
board members were not consulted with respect to these plans 
because Zions did not want Young's opposition (Tr. 265). Mr. 
Shea was permitted to draft his own job description (Tr. 
336-37) [Exhibit P-5] which gave him direct financial control 
over the operations of the Wycoff companies. Shea took his 
instructions from Claron Spencer (Tr. 341) and understood 
his job as building up corporate assets, keeping expenses 
-8-
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low, and getting as much money as possible out of the Wycoff 
Companies and into the hands of Zions (Tr. 334, 341-42). 
Pursuant to a request by Zions, a meeting of the board of 
Company was held on January 30, 1968, and a resolution was 
passed, over the objection of Max Young, creating the position 
of vice-president and comptroller [Exhibit D-13]. Young 
objected to the resolution for the reason that it would, in 
effect, take the control of the companies out of management's 
hands by limiting its ability to control employees, expendi-
tures, income and other important items. Shea was introduced 
to the board as the man who would assume the new position. 
The position gave Zions the control it desired to satisfy 
the needs of the estate at the expense of the companies' 
normal business objectives and goals* 
By letter dated February 1, 1968 [Exhibit P-2], directed 
to Mr. Spencer, Young outlined his objections to the appoint-
ment of the comptroller and said that the appointment had 
the effect of relieving appellant of all his duties with the 
companies. At a meeting of the board of Company held on 
February 13, 1968, the board, over Mr. Young's objection and 
negative vote, decided to treat the letter as a resignation 
[Exhibit D-49]. At trial, Spencer testified that there was 
no language of resignation in the letter (Tr. 273), and that 
-9-
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Young wasn't discharged for his failure to maintain profits 
for the companies (Tr. 274). On the other hand, Spencer 
testified that Young's resistance with respect to Zions 
plans for taking company funds to satisfy estate liabilities 
was seen as a reflection of Young's poor "moral fibre." Mr* 
Roger Andrus, a driver foreman for the Company, who had no 
experience in management, was elected president and general 
manager to replace Young at the February 13, 1968, meeting. 
Appellant Young continued to serve on the boards of 
directors of the Wycoff companies until October, 1968, v/hen 
he was dismissed therefrom. 
On November 6, 1968, the board of directors of Company 
directed a stock dividend of 1800 shares of a new class of 
recently created preferred stock having an aggregate par 
value of $180,000.00. Appellant received 450 shares of this 
preferred stock dividend [Exhibit D-5G]. Just fifteen days 
later and on November 21, 19 68, the board called the preferred 
stock for redemption [Exhibit P-64] at its par value of 
$100.00 per share. As reflected in the minutes, the purpose 
for the call was to generate funds for the estate. The 
redemption right was to expire at 5:00 p.m. on December 2, 
1968, and according to the board's resolution, stock not so 
redeemed was to remain outstanding on the books of the 
corporation. There was no indication that unredeemed stock 
would ever be subject to another call. The 
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redemption scheme was part of a preconceived plan to satisfy 
liabilities of the Wycoff estate and was not part of an ongoing 
business procedure. Appellants were forced to redeem their 
stock for $45,000, upon which they were forced to pay $15,000 
in taxes. The estate, however, received approximately 
$110,196.00 but paid no taxes on this income because of an 
exemption provided in §303 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 
U.S.C. §303. There was no apparent business purpose for 
this action, and it did not advance the financial position 
of the corporations. 
On December 2, 1968, debentures of Company totaling 
$50,000.00 were redeemed from the estate at a par value and 
the funds were again used to pay taxes. These debentures 
were not due until April 1, 1978, and bore interest at the 
rate of 7 percent per annum. 
According to Mr. Shea, vice-president and comptroller, 
the funds used for these redemptions were borrowed by Com-
pany from Mountain Service which in turn borrowed $300,000 
from Zions bank at 7 percent interest and secured the loan 
with Mountain Service equipment [Exhibit P-70, P-64]. The 
redemption alternative was chosen as the least expensive way 
to pay off the needs of the estate because it had less tax 
consequences to the estate than a dividend (Tr. 379-80} and 
-11-
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because the company would not have to pay any dividends to 
minority shareholders (Tr. 405). None of the funds were 
used to retire other outstanding loans of the Company, but 
the funds were obtained for the sole purpose of retiring the 
debentures and redeeming the preferred stock (Tr. 343-44, 
4 06). Again, the debenture retirement was done at the 
request of Zions (Tr. 346). More important, the redemption 
was effectuated during a period of decreasing earnings (Tr. 
344) [Exhibits P-58 through 63] and poor profits (Tr. 383). 
As a result of this scheme, the companies were placed in a 
poor credit position and had difficulty obtaining regular 
business loans from lending institutions, other than Zions, 
who offered better credit terms [See e.g. Exhibit P-53]. 
Mr. Spencer testified that the redemption tax exemption 
was seen as the best alternative for acquiring funds for the 
estate if the minority did not resist (Tr. 24 6). Spencer 
was aware that the companies would have to borrow funds to 
accomplish the redemption (Tr. 255), that the Company was, 
at that time, in a "short cash" position (Tr. 256), and that 
any funds received by minority shareholders would have to be 
treated as ordinary income (Tr. 247-48). However, despite 
the fact that sale of the debentures would have satisfied a 
large protion of the estatefs tax liabilities, Zions was 
-.12-
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unwilling to market the debentures because they were unsecured 
and would have had to be sold at a discount (Tr. 253). 
Neither Mr. Spencer or Mr. Shea could articulate any busines 
motive for these redemptions. 
Although the debentures bore interest at 7 percent per 
annum, their premature redemption resulted in an increased 
burden on the companies because the $300,000 note to Mountain 
Service was a demand not 
at rates ranging on an aA 
over the prime rate [Exhi 
was unwilling to sell the 
cause the company to incr 
after to pay interest to 1 
rates in excess of the pri 
Zions also caused oth 
Wycoff trust to be redeemer 
11, 1971; $5,000 on April ( 
$10,000 on October 11, 1972 
and $4,000 on September 6, 
(Tr. 345, 357) Zions redeei 
debentures as testamentary i 
of these debentures matured 
interest at 7 percent. There was no apparent business 
-13-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
purpose for any of these redemptions. Moreover, these 
redemptions were effectuated during a period of financial 
difficulty when the companies had other pressing business 
needs for the funds [See e.g. Exhibits P-37, P-38, P-39] 
A review of the books and records of the Wycoff Com-
panies conducted by Mr. Jackson, a certified public accoun-
tant for these firms, for the years 19 65 through 1969 [Exhibit 
P-29] concluded that as of February 1970: 
"A The working capital and cash balances of the 
companies in total has decreased substantially 
since December 31, 1967. 
B. Accounts receivable in total has increased substan-
tially since December 31, 1967. 
C. The companies1 over-all indebtedness unde^ r long-
term financing has increased substantially 
without any appreciable increase in assets since 
December 31, 1967." 
Certain accounting adjustments should be considered to 
determine the real financial position of the Wycoff companies 
in the years after Mr. Young's dismissal and during Zions1 
control. For example, substantial insurance rebates, earned 
by the companies before 1968, were attributed as income in 
years after 1968. The same is true with respect to rate 
increases due to the companies during 1966 and 1967. The 
depreciation schedule of the companies equipment was changed 
-14-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
after 19 68 from a double-declining balance method to a I 
straight line method (Tr. 358), resulting in an apparent increase 
in company income after 1968 of approximately $185,000.00 to 
$200,000.00, while the real asset value of the older fleet 
was substantially decreased. According to Mr. Shea the 
increased income before taxes of the companies was "directly 
attributable" to the depreciation method used currently as 
i • • . - . • . • ' . ; ; ' • 
compared to the method used previously. (Tr. 360) [Exhibit 
P-58] Finally, for certain years, items of extraordinary 
income were included in calculating gross income, such as 
$32,504 from the sale of the Freeport Warehouse in 1972 i 
[Exhibit P-58] These adjustments caused an unrealistic 
inflation of income during the years of Zions* control 
resulting in an even worse financial picture than Mr. Jackson 
had painted. I 
During the period 1967 through 1973 the growth of the 
four companies had been 65.4 percent or 11 percent per year 
[Exhibit D-71]. Appellants evidence, prepared from the 
financial statements received in evidence, [proposed Exhibits 
P-54 through P-57] indicated that for the period 1965 through 
1973, the average annual growth rate had been 10.89 percent 
per year since 1967, but from 1965 through 1967 the total 
i : 
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growth was 46.17 percent, or 23.09 percent per year. This 
latter evidence comports with Mr. Spencer's own testimony as 
to Zions purpose for taking control of the companies which 
was "to slow down growth so that greater use of the income 
and assets would be available to the trustee and executor" 
(Tr. 262). A comparison of the ratios of net income to 
total income for the period 1965 through 1973 reveals that 
this ratio fell from an annual average of 5.56 percent 
during 1965 through 1967, to the highest percentage of 3.92 
percent in 1968 and as low as 0.29 percent in 1967. Again 
these figures further illustrate the success of Zions1 
announced purpose in managing the Wycoff companies. 
Perhaps one of the major problems with Zion's control 
of the Wycoff Companies was its failure to provide skilled, 
competent, and qualified management. As Mr. Shea testified 
"we floundered around with a management team in a situation 
for which we were totally unprepared;" "We had a management 
team that didn't know how to get rate increases;" (Tr. 393, 
413)" "I have never been a manager for a company. I was not 
hired to manage the Wycoff Company. I have never attempted 
to manage the Wycoff Company or any of its affiliates." 
(Tr. 375). Mr. Andrus was elected president and general 
manager but he had no previous managerial experience. 
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Thus, while the Wycoff Companies labored under poor 
management, decreasing earnings, and increasing debt, all to 
the disadvantage of the minority shareholders, Zions and the 
estate reaped a harvest of corporate assets* 
A related dispute between appellants and respondents 
concerning the management of corporate affairs after the 
death of M. S. Wycoff centered around the interpretation of 
Milton Stanley Wycofffs will. Mr. Wycofffs intention on the 
matter of succession in management clearly appears in his 
will. It was his desire that the trustee operate the busi-
ness but that, if business conditions did not permit operation, 
it was within the trustee's discretion not to operate and 
preserve them. If they were operated, control was to be 
transferred to Bruce Wycoff gradually through the distri-
bution of stock or otherwise at such time as the businesses 
could be properly managed and controlled by him. [Exhibit P-
1 p . 4 ] . •:: 
The direction in the will relating to Mr. Young is much 
more emphatic. If the trustee elected to operate any business... 
"...then and in that event I direct ray Trustee to 
continue the operation of such corporations or bus-
inesses by continuing as executive officers and di-
rectors those persons who were occupying similar 
positions in said corporations or businesses at the 
time of my death, including directors and other cor-
porate, officers. However, I direct my Trustee to 
-17-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
name Max W. Young, if he is then living and is.then 
serving as an executive of any such corporations or 
businesses, as the chief executive of said corpora-
tions or businesses so long as he discharges his 
office or offices with fidelity and so long as said 
corporations or businesses are operated at a profit..•" 
[Exhibit P-l pp5 & 6]. (Emphasis added) 
The books and records of the four companies certainly 
show that they were operated profitably by Mr. Young from 
the time of Mr. Wycoff!s death until his removal by the 
bank, as was recognized by Mr. Spencer (Tr. 274). Apparently 
the only reason for Mr. Young's removal by Zions was his 
refusal to assist the trustee in his plan to drain off 
Company assets for the exclusive benefit of the Wycoff 
I estate. 
The final area of disagreement between the parties con-
cerns the transfer of corporate stock after the death of 
". "M. S. Wycoff. An agreement dated April 26, 1965, was 
executed by M. S. Wycoff and his wife LaPearl, Max W. Young 
and his wife Audrey, and C. Leland Clayton and his wife 
Eugenia. The agreement recited that Mr. Wycoff, Mr. Young 
and Mr. Clayton were each insured by a life insurance policy 
with Mountain Service as the beneficiary. It was agreed 
that upon the death of any of the insured parties the proceeds 
of the policy received by Mountain Service would be used to 
their full extent to redeem stock owned by the deceased. 
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Upon Mr. Wycoff1s death Mountain Service received 
$48,000.00 from the insurance policy. Pursuant to the 
agreement, Mountain Service tendered the funds to Zions as 
executor and demanded voting stock of Wycoff Company at book 
value. Zions interpreted the agreement of April 26, 1965, 
differently than the appellants and insisted that only non-
voting stock of Wycoff Company could be transferred to 
Mountain Service under the agreement [Exhibit D-71]. Despite 
this dispute as to what stock should be transferred, Mountain 
Service, by letter dated May 31, 1966 [Exhibit P-40], sent 
the $48,000.00 in insurance proceeds to Zions Bank because 
the bank had indicated that it was urgently needed by the 
estate. The bank held the $48,000.00 without tendering any 
stock to Mountain Service for a year and three months before 
returning the money to Mountain Service [Exhibits D-4]. The 
money was returned by Mountain Service to Zions as required 
by the agreement but was again sent back on November 14/ 
1967 [Exhibit D-46]. Finally, after Zions had gained control 
of the board of Mountain Service, the money was deposited in 
its account [Exhibit P-41] and was eventually used in its 
operations. Zions never has transferred any stock to Mountain 
Service pursuant to the agreement of April 26, 1965, although 
the agreement clearly contemplated the transfer of some 
stock. 
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Before his death, M. S. Wycoff indicated his intention 
that Max Young receive sufficient stockholder control to 
insure his continued management of the Wycoff Companies, so 
that if and when his son, Bruce Wycoff, should elect to 
continue the business, he would inherit a viable, profitable 
and on-going enterprise. A tax protest prepared in 1962, 
and signed by Mr. & Mrs. Wycoff clearly shows this intention 
[Exhibit P-30]. 
"The redemption of the Class B stock which had 
been purchased was determined to be necessary in order 
to avoid problems with respect to the succession of 
management. Max Young had been employed by the com-
pany for several years and had demonstrated management 
ability. He stated that he would prefer to start a 
business of his own unless he was given the opportunity 
to acquire an equity interest in the operations. Since 
he was a young man, he was selected to assume manage-
ment of the operations on the retirement or death of 
Mr. Wycoff and arrangements were made to sell or give 
Mr. Young sufficient stock for him, together with 
trustees of Wycoffrs estate, to control the corpora-
tion. To accomplish this, it became apparent that 
the Class B stock should be held in the same pro-
portion as the Class A stock. It was agreed that the 
Class B stock which had been issued for cash should 
be redeemed in order to provide the balance required 
to insure the management succession program determined 
to be in the best interest of the companies. This 
adjustment chould not have been accomplished by dividend 
distribution." (Emphasis added) 
Appellant always operated the Wycoff business with the 
intention of fulfilling the wishes of M. S. Wycoff and 
preserving a successful business for Bruce Wycoff. 
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At the time of his dismissal, Mr. Young was earning 
between $30,000.00 and $35,000.00 per year from the com-
panies plus other benefits, including car expenses. A 
portion of his income was attributable to Eagle Moving 
Company which he had acquired in 1960. After his dismissal, 
he earned approximately $19,500.00 in 1968, $20,907.00 in 
1969, $20,760.00 in 1970. $13,080.00 in 1971, $9,780.00 in 
1972, and $13,000.00 in 1973. [Exhibit D-79] • 
In August of 1971, William Shea, vice-president and 
comptroller of the companies, offered $275,000.00 for the 
plaintiffs1 stock interest in the Wycoff companies. The 
total was to be paid in annual installments of $25,000.00, 
with nothing down. As of December 31, 1970, the book value 
of the appellant's stock was $348,882.00, and as of December 
31, 1971, it was $376,665.00. Taking into consideration the 
operating rights of the Wycoff companies, which both Mr. 
Young and Mr. Shea testified were the most valuable assets, 
appellant's interest in the companies was easily worth 
between $600,000 and $1,000,000. In light of these facts, 
Mr. Shea's offer of August, 19 71, was rejected. 
The only disbursements' from the companies since Mr. 
Young's departure in 1968 have been the redemption of 
preferred stock for $180,000.00 in November, 1968, and 
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$124,439.00 in dividends paid by Company, Warehouse and 
Corporation in May, 1973 [Exhibits D-85, D~86 and D-87]. 
The occasion for each such distribution was a tax liability 
which the estate or trust desired to cover. 
At the present time there is no policy regarding the 
payment of dividends by the companies- If past performance 
is any indication, dividends will be paid if and when Zions 
Bank determines that funds are required for the trust which 
it controls and only after all other methods of getting 
money from the companies to the bank have been exhausted. 
No consideration v/ill be given to the needs of the minority, 
who have no control over an investment with a book value of 
at least $560,000. Appellant Max Young has invested a substantia! 
protion of his adult life in four closely held corporations 
and is now locked in with no hope of either selling his 
minority interest at v/hat it is worth or of having any voice 
in corporate affairs. 
ARGUMENT 
• I 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE CONTRARY TO 
THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND REPRESENT A 
WHOLESALE ADOPTION OF DEFENDANTS1 PROPOSED FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT THE EXERCISE OF INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT. 
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As the record shows, the trial court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment were prepared by 
defendants' counsel and were adopted, without alteration, by 
the court as its own. Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., provides: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury... 
the court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon... (Emphasis 
added) 
It is the unquestioned duty of the trial court to make 
findings on all material issues raised by the pleadings, 
Piper v. Hatch, 86 Utah 292, 43 P.2d 700, 701 (1935), and 
such findings must be in conformity with the evidence pre-
sented at trial, Hathaway v. United Tintic Mines Co., 42 
Utah 520, 132 P. 388, 389 (1913). While the court may seek 
the assistance of counsel in preparing its findings and 
conclusions, ultimate responsibility lies with the court 
which must exercise its independent judgment to evaluate all 
the facts without prejudice or bias. The findings must be 
objective, and, in equity cases, this Court retains the 
power to review the record and pass on the weight and suffi-
ciency of the findings if it is debatable whether the record 
supports the lower court. The findings and conclusions in 
this case represent only one side of the evidence and are 
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a wholesale adoption of the defendants' point of view. This 
court should exercise an independent review of the evidence 
and make its judgment on the basis of the record. 
.II 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO HOLD THAT THE ACTS OF RE-
SPONDENTS WERE NOT "OPPRESSIVE" AND A MISAPPLICATION OR 
WASTE OF CORPORATE ASSETS WITHIN THE MEANING OF 16-10-92 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953. 
Section 16-10-92 U.C.A. 1953, enacted in 1961, was 
taken verbatim from the Model Business Corporations Act 
prepared by a committee of the American Bar Association. 
This section provides, in part: 
The district court shall have full power to liqui-
date the assets and business of a corporation:: 
(a) In an action by a shareholder when it is 
established: 
* * * 
(2) that the acts of the director or 
those in control of the corporation are illegal, 
oppressive or fraudulent; or 
* * -k 
(4) that the corporate assets are being 
misapplied or wasted. 
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To the best of appellants1 knowledge, there are no Utah 
decisions interpreting the meaning of the above quoted 
statute, but in light of the fact that several other states 
also have adopted this section of the Model Business Corpora-
tions Act, the decisions of those jurisdictions are illustra-
tive in interpreting the meaning of this legislation. 
The most ambiguous portion of this statute is the term 
"oppressive." In determining the legislative intent underly-
ing this term, several concepts have been deemed important. 
First, the relationship between the shareholders of a closely 
held corporation is similar to that of partners in a partner-
ship. All shareholders generally are engaged in the active 
pursuit of corporate business, the success of the business 
depends on maintaining a harmonious relationship among 
shareholders, and usually there is no recognized market for 
an individual shareholder's interest. See Comment, Rights of 
the Minority Shareholders to Dissolve the Closely Held Cor-
poration, 43 Calif. L.Rev. 514 (1955). The meaning of 
"oppression" when considered in the context of a closely 
held corporation must be different from its meaning in the 
context of a publicly held corporation. The court must be 
free to exercise greater liberality in dissolving closely 
held corporations where the harm to the general public is 
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minimal and where a "frozen" minority shareholder may not 
easily withdraw his investment as in a partnership. 
Second, the directors and majority shareholders of a 
corporation owe a fiduciary duty to all shareholders and the 
"fiduciary relationship" among shareholders is an important 
element of oppression in an action under the Utah statute. 
See Note, Oppression as a Statutory Ground for Corporate Dis-
olution, 1965 Duke.L.J. 128, 132-33. 
"The devolution of unlimited power imposes on the 
holders of the majority of the stock a'correlative duty, 
the duty of a fiduciary or agent, to the holders of the 
minority of the stock, who can act only through them 
—the duty to exercise good faith, care, and diligence 
to make the property of the corporation produce the 
largest possible amount, to protect the interests of 
the holders of the minority of the stock, and to 
secure and pay over to them their just proportion 
of the income and of the proceeds of the corporate 
property. A dominant or controlling stockholder is 
declared to be a fiduciary. 18 Am.Jur.2d, Corpora-
tions §497 
See also, Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal 
Co., 64 F.2d 817 (4 Cir. 1933). A reviewing court must 
carefully evaluate the exercise of these fiduciary duties in 
deciding whether certain conduct is "oppressive." 
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Third, all the shareholders of a corporation have a 
right to be treated equally and fairly; benefits accruing to 
some stockholders, and not to others, can be grounds for 
dissolution. As one commentator states, !f[t]he 'oppression1 
required by [the Model Act] has normally been read to mean 
abuse of corporate position for private financial gain at 
the expense of other stockholders." Note, Dissolution--
Denial of Right to Participate in Management of Close 
Corporation Entitles Shareholder to Liquidation, 74 Harv.L.Rev, 
1461, 1462 (1961); Long v. Wilson Stove & Mfg. Co., 277 
Ill.App. 57 (1934). Where a minority shareholder has lost 
any effective voice in corporate affairs, the integrity of 
his investment will be in jeopardy unless the majority 
shareholders operate the business with fairness and equal 
concern for all shareholders. 
Finally, this statute was intended to provide remedial 
relief for abused shareholders. Even before these statutes 
were enacted, courts frequently exercised their equitable 
power to dissolve corporations in which the majority share-
holders had taken advantage of the minority. See, Hornstein, 
A Remedy for Corporate Abuse—Judicial Power to Wind Up a 
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Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 Colum, 
L.Rev. 220 (1940); Anno., "Inherent power of equity, at 
instance of a stockholder, to appoint a receiver for, or to 
wind up a solvent, going corporation, on ground of fraud, 
mismanagement or dissensions," 43 A.L.R. 288 (1926); 61 
A.L.R. 1212 (1929); 91 A.L.R. 665 (1934). The remedial, 
equitable nature of this action forms the basis for the 
current statute and should be considered when seeking 
legislative intent. 
While the definition of "oppressive" conduct is inherently 
flexible and permits substantial judicial latitude, the 
cases have fleshed out the meaning of this term. 
...[S]ome substance has been injected into th€>se 
terms [oppression, misconduct, gross mismanagement] 
by decisions which have held that majority actions 
such as plundering the corporation, siphoning off 
profits through excessive salaries to themselves 
as officers, and running the corporation for the 
sole benefit of the majority, constitute misconduct 
or gross mismanagement justifying dissolution. 
Note, Oppression as a Statutory Ground for Dissolution, 
supra at 131 & n. 18. See Tri-City Elec. Service Co. v. 
Jarvis, 206 Ind. 5, 185 N.E. 136 (1933) (majority shareholder 
misappropriated assets, refused to pay dividends, excluded 
minority from management); Klugh v. Coronula Mining Co., 66 
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S.C. 100, 44 S.E. 566 (1902) (majority shareholder paid 
himself large dividend, neglected the corporation, lost 
customers for the corporation); Hampton v. Buchanan, 51 
Wash.155, 98 P. 374 (1908) (majority shareholder raised own 
salary to absorb profit, deprived minority of a voice in 
management). The Commonwealth cases take a very liberal 
view of a minority shareholder's rights and only require a 
showing of "justifiable lack of confidence" to support a 
decree of dissolution. E.g. Lock v. John Blackwood, Ltd., 
[1924] A.C. 783. The very purpose of a corporation is to 
make a profit (§ 16-10-2(a), U.C.A. (1953) and, when the 
majority stockholders use the corporation as a vehicle for 
any other purpose, the minority have justifiable grounds for 
seeking dissolution. 
The most commonly used definition of "oppressive" 
conduct was provided by the Illinois Supreme Court in Central 
Standard Life Insurance Company v. Davis, 10 111.2d 566, 141 
N.E. 2d 45 (1957): 
"The word 'oppressive1 does not carry an 
essential inference of imminent disaster; it can, 
we think, contemplate a continuing course of con-
duct. 
"Plaintiff argues that the word 'oppressive' 
does not necessarily savor of fraud, and that the 
absence of 'mismanagement, or misapplication of 
assets' does not prevent a finding that the conduct 
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of the defendants has been oppressive. We agree with 
that interpretation, and we reject defendants" argument 
that the word is substantially synonymous with 'illegal1 
and 'fraudulent.1 Misapplication of assets or mismanage-
ment of funds are not, as we read the statute, indispen-
sable ingredients of 'oppressive1 conduct." 141 N.E. 
2d at p. 50. 
Mere continued corporate existence in the absence of pro-
spective profitable operation might in an appropriate case 
constitute oppression. The overall emphasis seems to be on 
the "cumulative effects of . . . many acts and incidents, 
and their . . . continuing nature", Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corru-
gated Box Co., 20 111.2d 208, 221, 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 
(1960). The recital of numerous acts of misconduct involving 
the sole asset of the corporation, coupled with dispro-
portionate loss to the minority, may constitute a claim of 
"oppression." "Thus, an abuse of corporate position for 
private gain at the expense of the stockholders is 'oppres-
sive1 conduct. . . .. [A]s to authorize the dissolution of 
the corporation. . . ." Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, 
Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 394 (Ore. 1973) 
In White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972), 
the Virginia Supreme Court upheld a lower court finding that 
the acts of a majority stockholder were oppressive. White 
owned 55% of the stock of P & W Oil Company and Perkins 
owned the remaining 45%. The corporation had filed a Subchapter 
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S election and thus its profits were attributed directly to 
the shareholders for federal tax purposes- During fiscal 
1968-69 the corporation showed earnings of $10,000.00 for 
federal tax purposes and White & Perkins were each required 
to report their portion thereof. White, however, refused to 
pay a dividend despite the fact that Perkins was forced to 
pay federal tax on the income. White also owned a service 
station which purchased supplies from the corporation on 
open account. He allowed the outstanding balance owed by 
the service station to the corporation to go from nothing to 
over $12,000.00 apparently after Perkins had indicated that 
he would attempt to dissolve it. Although White had initial-
ly agreed to lease his service station to the corporation, 
he later refused to do so, but at the time that Perkins 
sought dissolution, White billed the corporation for.rental 
on the service station. The Virginia Supreme Court agreed 
with the lower court that these acts were oppressive and 
indicated that the corporation should either be dissolved or 
a custodian appointed, these being the two alternatives 
provided for by Virginia's statute. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held that unfair treatment of minority preferred 
shareholders was grounds for the appointment of a receiver 
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in Tower Hill Connellsville Coke Co, v. Piedmont Coal Co,, 
33 F.2d 703 (4 Cir. 1929), and eventually ordered dissolution 
and liquidation because of the activities of the majority. 
Tower Hill Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 
F.2d 817 (4 Cir. 1933). The action was brought by the 
holders of preferred stock, entitled to a 6 percent cumulative 
annual dividend which had not been paid for a number of 
years. No dividend could be paid to the common stockholders 
until the preferred dividend had been paid or set aside. Of 
course, in liquidation the preferred stock was entitled to 
be paid at par plus any cumulative dividends which were in 
arrears. Although the preferred stock had the right to 
vote, the amount of issued and outstanding common stock 
prevented the preferred shareholders from having any voice 
in operating the company. 
The only asset of the corporation was stock in a Pennsyl-
vania corporation which owned and operated a coal mine and 
coke plant. 
Two considerations led the court to hold that the 
minority preferred shareholders were not being treated 
"fairly": first, the purchase of preferred shares at very 
low prices and retirement thereof while dividends thereon 
were greatly in arrears, and second, the contention by the 
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company that all of the assets of the subsidiary were neces-
sary to improve the coke plant rather than pay dividends. 
Additional borrowing was also required for this purpose. 
The court said that if the company had funds with which to 
purchase preferred shares at a very low price and retire the 
same, it should have funds with which to pay the 6 percent 
cumulative dividend. Under these circumstances the court 
authorized the appointment of receivers to go into the 
Pennsylvania courts and ...bring all necessary and proper 
actions to protect the interests of the plaintiffs...". 
F.2d at p. 709. 
By the time the second Tower Hill case reached the 
court, the corporation had dissolved the Pennsylvania subsi-
diary and distributed its assets to Tower Hill. Both before 
and after this transfer the Pennsylvania corporation and 
Tower Hill exchanged and sold properties to corporations 
controlled by the "Hillman interests,11 which also controlled 
Tower Hill and the Pennsylvania corporation. According to 
the court all of these enterprises had interlocking directors 
and this "board apparently had no independent judgment of 
its own and was merely used by J. H. Hillman, Jr., as a 
willing instrument to carry out whatever he dictated." 64 
F.2d at p. 820. 
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Referring to the minority stockholders the court said: 
"We have here no desire of stockolders to escape 
the consequence of their stock purchase nor desire to 
withdraw from a bad bargain, but an earnest effort by 
these plaintiffs to rescue at least some part of their 
investment from an arbitrary, unjust, and tyrannical 
domination by a ruthless majority - a majority that 
acts entirely without regard to that trust relation-
ship that exists between a controlling majority and a 
minority in a stock company. While the controlling 
majority are not to be deemed trustees in any techni-
cal sense, they have a real duty to protect the interests 
of the minority when they undertake to run a corporation 
without giving them (the minority) a voice in its man-
agement. The law governing the control of corpora-
tions by a majority of stockholders is based upon 
fair dealing and a proper conduct of the affairs of 
a corporation with due respect to the rights of the 
minority by those in control. These elements of jus-
tice we do not find in this case." 64 F.2d at p. 824-
The Court went on to say: 
"When several persons have a common interest in 
property, equity will not allow one to appropriate 
it exclusively to himself, or to impair its vailue to 
the others. Community of interest involves mutual 
obligation. Persons occupying this relation towards 
each other are under an obligation to make the prop-
erty or fund productive of the most that can be ob-
tained from it for all who are interested in it, at 
the expense of those whose rights in it are the same 
as their own, are unfaithful to the relation they 
have assumed, and are guilty, at least, of construc-
tive fraud." 64 F.2d at p. 826. [Emphasis added]. 
See also, Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 6 Ill.App.3d 
488, 285 N.E.2d 574 (1972); Gray v. Hall, 10 Ill.App.3d 
1030, 205 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1973). 
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Henn, in his treatise on Corporations sums up the 
relationship between fiduciary duty and minority oppression 
as follows: 
Since directors, with respect to their exercies 
of their management functions, owe fiduciary duties 
to the corporation to exercise unbiased judgment 
in the best interests of the corporation as a whole, 
any attempt by directors to favor one intracorporate 
group to the detriment of another breaches such duties 
to the corporation and, in a sense, violates the im-
plied terms in the share contract between the corpor-
ation and any oppressed shareholder to the effect that 
corporate affairs will be managed in the best interests 
of the corporation. 
Controlling shareholders, especially when approving 
extraordinary corporate matters requiring shareholder 
approval, are usually subjected to fiduciary duties. 
Such fiduciary duties preclude "fraud on the minority" 
or "oppression of the minority", or fraudulent, bad 
faith, or unfair results. In close corporations, some 
fiduciary duties among the shareholders, possibly 
analogous to those among partners, have been recognized. 
Henn, Law of Corporations, §240, (West,2d ed. 1970) 
(Emphasis added) 
The above mentioned principals should guide this court 
in its interpretation of the statute and in its evaluation 
of the evidence. The trial court, however, concluded that: 
Defendant Wycoff corporations and their Board of 
Directors did not act in an improper or oppressive 
manner in violation of the rights of the plaintiffs as 
minority stockholders under Section 16-10-92 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, or at all. [Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusion No. 1] 
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It cannot seriously be contested, as the record in this 
matter illustrates, that Zions Bank directed the operations 
of the Wycoff companies with two principal objectives in 
mind: first, to obtain funds from the companies whenever 
such funds were required by Zions as trustee to satisfy 
estate liabilities, and second, to preserve the ownership of 
the corporations for future transfer to Bruce Wycoff. While 
the latter objective was mentioned in M.S. Wycoff's will, 
the bank never gave any serious consideration to the other 
provisions of the will which directed that Max Young was to 
remain as chief executive and that the businesses were to be 
continued in their historical manner. 
As controlling shareholder and director of these com-
panies, Zions clearly abdicated its primary obligation, 
namely, to maximize profits for all shareholders and distri-
bute those profits in the form of regular dividends. In all 
its actions, Zions operated the corporations without regard 
to the interests of the minority shareholders, and instead, 
used the corporations as a vehicle for siphoning off assets 
for the sole and exclusive benefit of the Wycoff estate. 
Respondents1 conduct is analogous to those cases where con-
trolling shareholders and/or directors pay themselves ex-
cessive salaries, waste corporate assets, or otherwise deal 
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in corporate affairs for their own self interest and in 
violation of the interests of the other corporate owners. 
These cases have almost uniformly held that such conduct 
constitutes oppression, misconduct, gross mismanagementf 
and, in some cases even fraud, justifying dissolution of the 
corporations at the request of the abused minority share-
holders. The instant case is the same. 
On various occasions, Zions compelled the premature 
redemption of debentures held by majority shareholders and 
further redeemed preferred stock to generate income for the 
estate. Zions also compelled the corporation to borrow 
funds at higher than normal interest rates to effectuate 
these redemptions. Under 16-10-5 U.C.A. 1953, the repur-
chase of shares by a corporation is permitted "only to the 
extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus" without 
a two-thirds vote of all shares. And 16-10-44 U.C.A. 1953 
further restricts the payment dividends to "unrestricted 
earned surplus." The intent of these sections is to prohibit 
distributions of corporate assets which would damage the 
corporation's financial position to the detriment of corporate 
creditors and non-distributee owners. The distributions and 
purchases made at the direction of Zions were contrary to 
the spirit and intent of these statutes. Even if there was 
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some earned surplus on the books to justify the stock dividend, 
redemption of debentures and repurchase of stock, these 
earnings were needed to enable the corporations to obtain 
credit and satisfy the needs of growth. Moreover, Zions 
distributions were not intended to benefit all shareholders, 
but were designed for the estate's exclusive benefit. 
Perhaps if Zions was the sole owner of these corporations 
its conduct would have been excusable, since, in that event, 
only their own interests would have been risked. In this 
case, however, appellants made substantial investments of 
time, money and ability in these businesses over a period of 
20 years, they owned 25 percent of the corporations and had a 
right, as partial owners, to have the corporations managed 
in such a way as would increase the value of thier invest-
ments. They had the right to see the corporations grow and 
prosper. Instead, Zions operated these businesses as if it 
were the only owner; as if the interests of the estate and 
the corporations were "parallel"; as if corporate assets 
were its exclusive property; as if the minority shareholders 
were non-existent. It was Zion's announced purpose to "slow 
the growth" of the corporations so that it could drain off 
assets to satisfy its own needs. Clearly this is the kind 
of "oppressive" conduct contemplated in 16-10-92 U.C.A. 1953 
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and against which the statute was enacted as a form of 
relief. 
The largest distribution from the companies ($180,000.00 
in 1968) had disastrous tax consequences for the minority. 
From 1968 until 1973 (5 years) nothing was paid the minority 
and the companies obviously suffered financially from the 
large 1968 payment. Furthermore, $50,000.00 in long-term 
debentures bearing a low rate of interest were prematurely 
redeemed from the estate in December, 1968; another $56,000.00 
in those same kind of debentures were prematurely redeemed 
by the companies between 1968 and 1973. These transactions 
occured without any apparent business justification while 
the minority received no dividends, other corporate debt was 
not satisfied in the same manner, and the companies were 
forced to incur additional debt at higher interest rates. 
Only when the bank was in need of tax money, was a distribu-
tion declared which again had adverse tax conceguences for 
the minority. Moreover, as the record indicates, Zions had 
other non-oppressive alternatives for satisfying the estate's 
tax liabilities, but it steadfastly refused to exercise 
these alternatives. 
The grossly inadequate offer of $275,000.00 by William 
Shea to Mr. Young for the plaintiffs1 stock in the companies 
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in 1961 evidences an attempt to squeeze out the minority. 
The offer included no down payment and small annual payments. 
It was well below the book value of the stock and both men 
were well aware that the most valuable asset of Wycoff 
Company, its operating authorities,, were hardly ever re-
flected in the book value of the stock. 
The failure of the bank to transfer any stock to Mountain 
Service pursuant to the April 26, 1965, agreement demonstrates 
its determination to run the Wycoff companies as it saw fit 
regardless of contractual or legal obligations imposed upon 
it. This is to say nothing of its failure to comply with 
the duty imposed upon it by M. S. Wycofffs will to employ 
Mr. Young. 
In close corporations, not only do the normal fiduciary 
duties of controlling shareholders apply, but, because of 
the partnership-like relationship among the owner-director-
manager shareholders, a higher, more carefully scrutinized 
standard of fiduciary responsibility is required. While 
such fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders do not 
disqualify them from exercising their voting rights with 
respect to various matters, they must do so with fairness, 
equality and due regard to the rights and interests of the 
minority. The evidence in this case demonstrates that 
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respondents have not only flagrantly abused and violated 
their fiduciary duties, but are likely to continue to do so 
in the future. As a result, appellants are entitled to 
reestablish the integrity of their ownership interest 
through a dissolution of the Wycoff corporations. 
Ill 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO REFUSE TO ENFORCE THE PRO-
VISIONS OF THE M. S. WYCOFF WILL WITH RESPECT TO THE RE-
TENTION OF MAX YOUNG. 
Respondents argue that the control of the corporation 
is vested in the board of directors whose right and duty to 
appoint or discharge supersedes any wish or direction ex-
pressed in the will of M. S. Wycoff. Such a contention is 
contrary to the law as established in those few cases where 
this issue has been adjudicated. In the case of In re Pit-
tock's Will, 102 Ore. 159, 199 P. 633 (1921), a majority 
shareholder of a newspaper corporation bequeathed his stock 
to trustees for a period of years, during which period it 
should be held intact and none sold. The will expressly 
provided that the trustees should vote the stock in favor of 
themselves as directors of the corporation and that Harden 
should be retained as manager and Piper as editor. The 
court in reference to the testatorfs right to make the above 
provisions in his will, stated: 
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"The testator was the owner in his individual 
right of a majority of the stock of the corporation. 
He had a right, as an attribute of property exercised 
in testamentary form, to direct how and for whom the 
stock should be voted. No one can rightly say that, 
if Pittock living had announced his intention steadily 
for 20 years to vote for certain directors who would 
in turn carry out certain policies as to employees, 
he could have been enjoined from the consummation 
of his purpose. How, then, can it be said that 
he cannot direct his trustees to do that same thing 
after his death, for a limited period? 
* "k "k 
In this instance, during his lifetime th€> tes-
tator could and probably did vote his stock so as 
to secure the election of directors to his liking. 
From the testimony it is plain that Mr. Pittock 
desired to perpetuate, for a time, at least, the 
existing personnel of the editorial and managerial 
departments of his corporation, the Oregonian Pub-
lishing Company, of which he was the principal owner, 
and to maintain the standing of the Oregonia, which 
under his direction had attained wide influence in the 
newspaper world..... It was certainly lawful for the 
living owner of two-thirds of the stock so to shape 
the directorate as to accomplish this purpose,. 
Equally after his death, so far as he lawfully could 
direct by testamentary disposition of his property, 
it was competent to promote the same end by the same 
means." [Emphasis added] 
The argument was then made that to give effect to the 
intention of the testator would be in conflict with the 
trustees1 obligations as directors to carry out the real 
interests of the corporation. The court considered whether 
the words "desire" and "request," as used in the will di-
recting the trustees to retain the employees, were precatory 
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but indicated that even if mandatory the provision was not 
thereby illegal. The court stated: 
"More than all that, it is not shown or intimated 
that the agreement, if there was one, to employ Morden 
and Piper, would be harmful to the best interests 
of the corporation or hurtful to the interests of the 
other stockholders, or that it was based upon any 
benefit private or personal to Pittock. Their long 
retention in the service of the corporation attests 
their ability and faithfulness, and in the light of 
the best authorities it was legitimate for the con-
trolling stockholder so to shape the direction of 
his property and his testamentary instructions to 
his trustees as to express his best judgment and 
give it effect in corporate operation through the 
regular channel of a board of directors elected by 
that stock." [Emphasis added] 
M. S. Wycofffs shareholdings in each of the four sub-
ject corporations represents a clear majority of the voting 
stock which, had he been alive, would undoubtedly be the 
basis for sufficient voting power to carry out his wishes. 
When the stock of Max Young and his family are coupled with 
that of the trustee, they hold between 80 percent and 86 
percent of the stock in the four subject corporations. 
For similar holdings, see In Re Peinston's Estate, 196 
Misc. 590, 92 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1949); and Myers v. Pink, 42 
Ill.App.2d 230, 191 N.E.2d 659 (1963). 
Although it would be impractical for Max Young to re-
assume office as the chief executive of the Wycoff companies, 
the conduct of the bank in disregarding its legal duty to 
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employ him further demonstrates its determination to run 
these companies for the sole and exclusive benefit of the 
trusts which it controls and to preserve them for Bruce 
Wycoff. The interests of minority shareholders play no part 
in bank decisions* 
IV 
IN WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FAIL TO ENFORCE OR GIVE 
ANY EFFECT TO THE APRIL 26, 1965, AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE 
TRANSFER OF STOCK TO MOUNTAIN SERVICE CORPORATION THROUGH 
THE USE OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS. , 
On April 26, 1965, M. S. Wycoff, Max Young, C. Leland 
Clayton, their wives, and Bruce Wycoff executed an agreement 
whereby the life insurance proceeds from a Group Life Insur-
ance Policy on the lives of M. S. Wycoff, Max Young, C. 
Leland Clayton and Bruce Wycoff would be paid to Mountain 
Service, Inc., as beneficiary, upon the death of any one of 
the insureds and "said proceeds will be used to redeem, to 
the extent of such proceeds, the stock that each deceased 
...owned in said Four Corporations at the time of his death." 
[Emphasis added] The agreement, by its terms, was binding 
on the parties successors in interest, including without 
limitation, any decedent's estate. [Exhibit P-3] The 
agreement further recited that "[t]he purpose and consider-
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ation for this action is well known, understood and mutually 
agreed to by the parties hereto, the receipt, sufficiency 
and validity of said consideration being expressly acknow-
ledged by each and all of the parties hereto." 
After M. S. Wycoff's death, $48,000 in insurance proceeds 
were paid to Mountain Service, Inc. None of these proceeds 
have ever been used for the redemption or purchase of any 
stock. A dispute arose between appellants and respondents 
concerning the kind of stock which should be redeemed; 
respondents contended that it was preferred and voting stock 
in the ratio of 14:1, and appellants contended that only 
voting stock should be redeemed. Admittedly, the agreement 
is ambiguous with respect to the kind of stock contemplated 
for the redemption, and parol evidence was admitted on this 
question. There is no dispute, however, that the redemption 
of some stock was contemplated by the parties to the agreement. 
The agreement has never been modified or recinded by the 
parties thereto. 
Generally, an agreement among shareholders to combine 
in the exercise of their shareholder functions is valid on 
the ground that shareholders may do collectively what they 
can do individually so long as there is an absence of fraud 
or some other illegal objective. See, Henn, The Law of 
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Corporations, §267 (West, 2d ed. 1970); 19 Am.Jur.2d Corpor-
ations §684. These agreements may be judicially enforced as 
contracts by a party thereto. The only exception to this 
general rule is where shareholders attempt to interfere with 
the direction of the board of directors concerning the 
proper management of the corporation, but even in these 
cases where the interference is slight, there is no damage 
to the corporation or to the public, and the shareholders 
are also the directors of the corporation, the agreements 
have been recognized as valid and enforceable in many juris-
dictions. See e.g., Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 
641 (1939). Henn, supra at p. 532, summarizes the subject 
as follows: 
Agreements by shareholders qua shareholders (absent 
fraud on the minority or other illegal object) in-
volve no impingement on the "statutory norms" and 
are valid. Agreements which go beyond this and 
only slightly impinge on the "statutory norms1" are, 
under the "no damage" test valid if they do not 
injure creditors, the public, or the shareholders; 
the public is not damaged by slight impingements 
on the "statutory norms"; shareholders clearly are 
not damaged if they all are parties to the agreement, 
and possibly are not damaged even when less than all 
of the shareholders are parties. 
In the instant case, the parties to the April 26, 1965, 
agreement dealt only with the transfer of their individually 
owned property. They elected to use Mountain Service as a 
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vehicle to effectuate the desired transfer but also provided 
Mountain Service with sufficient funds (the insurance proceeds) 
to effectuate this transfer. The parties were also directors 
of Mountain Service, and there would have been no damage 
whatsoever to Mountain Service in complying with the terms 
of the agreement. Each of the parties transferred their 
right to select a beneficiary in consideration for compliance 
with the agreement and each party has a right to demand that 
the agreement be enforced according to its terms. If those 
terms are ambiguous, then this court should seek the intent 
of the parties and enforce the agreement according to that 
intention, or remand to the trial court for a finding on 
that issue. 
V 
LIQUIDATION AND DISSOLUTION OF THE WYCOFF COMPANIES IS AN 
APPROPRIATE REMEDY TO REDRESS THE OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT OF THE 
RESPONDENTS. 
In determining whether dissolution and liquidation is 
an appropriate remedy to rectify oppressive conduct on the 
part of majority shareholders, this court should first, look 
to the facts existing at the time the complaint was filed; 
Sullivan v. Central Land Co., 173 Ala. 426, 55 So. 612 
(1911); second, determine whether dissolution will provide 
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effective relief to the minority stockholders; and lastly 
consider whether there is some alternative solution which 
will be as effective for the minority. Using this analysis, 
dissolution of the Wycoff companies appears to be the most 
effective remedy for the appellants. 
Mr. Shea testified that the primary purpose of organ-
izing four independent corporations was to achieve tax 
advantages and that this multi-purpose'tax advantage had 
been dissipated as of the end of 1974 (Tr. 364) . Mr. Shea 
further testified that the business and operations of Wycoff 
Warehouse and Wycoff Corporation are somewhat autonomous in 
that they are not closely connected with the business of 
Wycoff Company and Mountain Service, except for the common 
use of facilities, and that, with proper lease arrangements, 
the operations could be severed from one another in such a 
way as to permit their continued operation without too much 
upset (Tr. 364-65). Mr. Young's testimony also supports 
this conclusion (Tr. 429-31). In fact, at one time Shea 
attempted to sell the warehousing corporations to generate 
needed captial but had limited success because of the high 
corporate debt burden (Tr. 261). A dissolution arrangement 
could easily be formulated to sever the control of the four 
corporations and distribute the assets from one or more of 
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these corporations to appellants in exchange for their stock 
in the remaining corporations. Of course, any additional 
boot would have to be paid by the respective parties• 
A second alternative would be to liquidate the assets 
of all the corporations and distribute these assets to the 
shareholders in exchange for their stock. This remedy is 
less advantageous since it would result in the discontinu-
ation of four on-going businesses but it would result in the 
most equitable apportionment of interests and could be 
designed to minimize any adverse consequences. Finally, the 
court could appoint an independent accountant to appraise 
the worth of appellant's stock and then make arrangements to 
compel the purchase of appellants stock by the four companies 
at its true value. 
If none of these alternatives is chosen, appellants 
will be left without any way of protecting their investment 
in these corporations; an investment which represents appel-
lants' contribution of time, energy, money, and ability to 
the corporate business over a period of more than 20 years. 
Appellants are not donee beneficiaries of their stock; they 
earned and paid for this interest through hard work, fidelity 
to corporate affairs, and the forebearance of alternative 
investments and employment. Appellants' close association 
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with these companies served to protect and enhance their 
investment as well as the investments of the other share-
holders. Nov; appellants have been ousted from corporate 
management, have lost any effective voice in corpoirate 
affairs, and are victims of a single-minded majority who 
seek only to use the corporations to further the interests 
of the majority. 
Appellants have no reasonable expectation of future 
dividends; they must look forward to continued mismanagement 
of corporate affairs, disinterest on the part of management 
with the pursuit of profits, and unjustified drains on 
corporate revenues. The minority are locked in to a cor-
porate structure over which they have no control, which is 
not interested in enhancing the value of their investment, 
and which refuses to purchase their otherwise unmarketable 
stock at its true value. If appellants have no remendy, 
they will be forced to helplessly watch the value of their 
2 0 year investment dwindle. Thus, an appropriate remedy in 
this situation would be to break up these four corporations, 
allow appellants to operate one or more of the corporations 
at a profit to protect their interests, and allow the majority 
shareholders to operate the remaining companies for whatever 
purpose they desire. In this manner, the interests of both 
parties will be satisfied. 
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RELIEF TO WHICH APPELLANTS 
ARE ENTITLED 
As admitted by respondents, no stock has ever been 
transferred to Mountain Service pursuant to the agreement of 
April 26, 1965. The court should exercise its power to 
reverse the district court and order respondents to comply 
with the terms of that contract and further direct the 
purchase of such stock as this court, or the district court, 
finds was contemplated in the agreement by Mountain Service. 
Because of the breach of their duty under the will of 
M. S. Wycoff to employ Max Young, this court should reverse 
the district court and award Young the actual damages suffer-
ed by him. These damages should be measured by the difference 
between his income while an employee of the companies and 
his income after his discharge. 
Finally, this court should reverse the district court 
and, pursuant to 16-10-93 U.C.A. 1953 appoint a liquidating 
receiver with authority to collect the assets of the cor-
porations, and, under the direction of the district court, 
distribute the assets in cash or in kind as set for in 16-
10-93. 
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CONCLUSION 
The manifest injustice imposed upon the appellants by 
the continued operation of the Wycoff companies under the 
direction of their boards of directors controlled by respon-
dent Zions can only be remedied by the intervention of this 
court pursuant to the equitable powers vested in it by the 
provisions of 16-10-92 U.C.A. 1953. This provision was 
enacted to protect minority shareholders from oppressive 
acts of those in control of corporations. There is no 
requirement that it be shown that irreparable injury is 
being suffered by the corporation because of the acts of 
those in control, but merely that their actions are prejudi-
cial ;to the interests of the minority. The actions of the 
respondents clearly are not directed at obtaining the best 
possible profit for the corporations and thus the largest 
return to their shareholders. Rather, the companies are 
being operated for the sole and exclusive benefit of the 
trusts controlled by Zions First National Bank. Any income 
received by appellants from the corporations is merely an 
incidental result of the cash requirements of the trusts— 
and such income comes only after the bank has exhausted all 
other available avenues of draining funds from the corpora-
tions. 
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Unless this court intervenes in this situation, the 
appellants will never have any voice in the manner in which 
the companies are operated. As such they will have no con-
trol over their most valuable asset, and because of the 
closed nature of the corporations they will never be able to 
dispose of their stock at any reasonable price. 
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Attorneys for Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing this 2^T day of 
September, 1976, to J. Thomas Greene, Esq., Callister, 
Greene & Nebeker, 800 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84133, and to Harry D. Pugsley, Esq., Watkiss & Camp-
bell, Suite 400, 315 East Second South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, respondents' attorneys, postage prepaid. 
7$/ R. MONT McDOW&L 
-53-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
